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THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND
THE POLITICAL PROCESS
David P. Leonard*
I. Introduction
It has long been an important tenet of American evidence law
that character evidence be regulated strictly. The Federal Rules of
Evidence have maintained this perspective in virtually all its as-
pects, perhaps most importantly by making character evidence
inadmissible as circumstantial proof of a person's extrajudicial con-
duct in all but the most narrow of circumstances. There are good
reasons for such constraints on the use of character, and nothing in
the modern study of psychology would suggest any need-or justi-
fication for wholesale rejection of the common law rules in all cases
or, for that matter, in a particular subset of trials.
In their first twenty years, most provisions of the Federal Rules
of Evidence have been spared any amendment save removal of
gender bias. And the rules regulating the use of character evi-
dence, for all its various uses, have been no exception. But re-
cently, Congress has exhibited significant interest in the rules it
adopted without much controversy (except with respect to a few
provisions) in 1975. Congress apparently now sees in the Federal
Rules an opportunity to effectuate substantive political and social
policy.
In this Essay, I examine this development in light of Congress's
boldest move to date, the proposed enactment of three rules appar-
ently designed to open wide the door for character evidence in cer-
tain classes of criminal and civil cases dealing with sexual assault
and child molestation. Specifically, I explain that because the
political process has always played a role in shaping the Federal
Rules, the Rules have never been entirely neutral toward the sub-
stantive policies of the law. Even so, for the most part this political
influence has not changed the evidence rules fundamentally from
their common law shape. With the new proposed rules, however,
Congress has taken a far more dramatic leap toward politicizing
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los An-
geles. B.A., 1974, University of California at San Diego; J.D., 1977, University of
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insights.
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the law of evidence. In the process, Congress has reversed long-
standing evidentiary policy, radically changed the shape of the
rules governing character evidence, and challenged one of the key
assumptions underlying the Federal Rules: that the evidence rules,
for the most part, should apply the same way in different kinds of
cases and treat different types of litigants similarly. These changes
do not bode well for the future stability of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Part II briefly describes the regulation of character evidence at
common law and, until now, under the Federal Rules.' Part III
shows that the political process has indeed affected the shape of the
Federal Rules from the beginning, but that the rules adopted have
not departed fundamentally from the common law.2 Part IV ex-
plains how the proposed rules would alter existing rules, and exam-
ines both the profound nature of these specific changes and the
degree to which the law of evidence as a whole might be affected.3
II. The Regulation of Character Evidence at Common Law and
Under the Federal Rules
To understand how character evidence is regulated, it is neces-
sary first to describe the most common means by which character
might4 be proven (the types of character evidence), and the most
common uses to which character evidence might be put.
There are three primary ways in which a person's character may
be proven. First, one can offer testimony as to a person's commu-
nity reputation for a relevant character trait. While generally
thought to be a weak form of proof,5 it was also the most com-
monly allowable form of proof at common law. 6 Similarly, under
the Federal Rules, reputation continues to be one of the favored
methods of proving character.7 The second, and somewhat more
probative, way to prove character is by offering the testimony of a
person familiar enough with the individual at issue to have a poten-
1. See infra notes 4-37 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 38-139 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 140-164 and accompanying text.
4. The word "might" is used here so as not to indicate that the rules allow this
form of character evidence to be offered in all or any particular kinds of cases. What
will be described in the paragraph to follow is merely the possible kinds of proof, not
their permissibility.
5. Wigmore called reputation "the secondhand, irresponsible product of mult-
plied guesses and gossip." 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 1986, at 244 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1978).
6. Id. §§ 1983-1986.
7. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
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tially valid opinion of an aspect of that person's character. Opinion
evidence was greatly restricted at common law, but under the Fed-
eral Rules is admissible whenever reputation evidence is admissi-
ble.8 The most restricted means of proving character, both at
common law and under the Federal Rules, is evidence of specific
instances of a person's conduct that tend circumstantially to reveal
that person's character. For example, evidence that a person had
engaged in fistfights with other fans at several football games
would be thought to reveal a somewhat violent character.
There are several purposes for which character evidence might
be used. Three are mentioned most commonly. First, character
might itself be an essential element of a criminal charge, a civil
claim or a defense to either.9 Second, character evidence might be
used as circumstantial proof of the truthful or untruthful character
of a witness, thus supporting or casting doubt on the credibility of
the witness's testimony.10 Finally, character evidence might be
used as circumstantial proof of the extrajudicial conduct of a per-
son, thus tending to demonstrate how that person might or might
not have acted on a particular occasion relevant to the action."
The admissibility of character evidence for its first potential use,
commonly referred to as "character in issue," is not controversial.
Indeed, if the substantive law makes the character of a party a mat-
ter that must be established in order to prevail in a claim or de-
fense, principles of evidence law could not exclude it; to do so
would be to nullify the substantive rule by making it impossible to
effectuate. 12 Thus, when character is "in issue," evidence rules ad-
mit character evidence essentially without limitation.'3
8. FED. R. EvID. 405(a) (providing that whenever character evidence may be
offered, character may be proven by reputation or opinion evidence).
9. See, e.g., Cleghorn v. New York Central & H. River Ry. Co., 56 N.Y. 44,46-48
(1874) (railroad switchman's character for drunkenness, known to company, was
source of liability and perhaps of punitive damages).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 21 M.J. 117, 123 (C.M.A. 1985) (criminal
defendant's prior acts of dishonesty in failing to disclose certain damaging informa-
tion on warrant officer application were admissible to impeach).
11. See, e.g., Seabrook v. State, 348 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(criminal defendant charged with aggravated assault should have been permitted to
offer evidence of his community reputation for "peacefulness and tranquility").
12. For a discussion of the relationship between rules of substantive law and evi-
dentiary rules, see David P. Leonard, Rules of Evidence and Substantive Policy, 25
Lov. L.A. L. REV. 797 (1992).
13. The result is reached by implication from FED. R. EVID. 405. Part (a) of the
rule provides that any time character evidence may be offered, character may be
proved using reputation or opinion evidence. Part (b) provides that when character is
"an essential element of a charge, claim or defense," character may be proven using
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It is the circumstantial uses of character evidence that have been
most tightly regulated. When character evidence is offered to es-
tablish the credibility (or lack of credibility) of a witness, the rules
are narrow. Under the Federal Rules, for example, opinion and
reputation evidence are admissible only when the evidence refers
to character for "truthfulness or untruthfulness," and evidence of
truthfulness is admissible only if the witness's character for truth-
fulness has been attacked.' 4 Furthermore, evidence of specific in-
stances of conduct bearing on the credibility of a witness is divided
into two types of situations: those in which the evidence concerns
the underlying conduct itself;15 and those in which the evidence
concerns a criminal conviction.'6 In both instances, admissibility is
carefully regulated.' 7
Fairly early in the common law development of evidentiary rules,
it was apparently common to admit evidence of character to prove
conduct.' 8 Eventually, however, this rule was overturned, and
courts generally excluded evidence of character when offered for
this purpose. 19 American courts have certainly excluded such evi-
dence for over a century, recognizing only very narrow exceptions.
In 1948, the Supreme Court attempted to explain the complex
common law rules governing the use of character evidence to
specific instances of conduct. Taken together, these provisions would make character
provable by any of the three common methods whenever character is "in issue." See 1
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 302 (5th ed. 1990).
14. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
15. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
16. FED. R. EVID. 609.
17. Specific instances of conduct to attack or support the credibility of a witness
may not be proven by extrinsic evidence. The court has discretion to permit, on cross-
examination, inquiry into specific instances of conduct that are probative of the wit-
ness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness or that of another witness as to
whose character the present witness has testified. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). The admissi-
bility of criminal convictions to impeach depends on the complex interrelation of sev-
eral factors, including the type of witness (a criminal defendant is treated differently
than all other witnesses), and the type and age of the impeaching crime. For an analy-
sis of the delicate balance Congress has struck in regulating the admissibility of a
witness's prior convictions to impeach, see Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction
Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rules 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295
(1994).
18. Wigmore wrote, "Historically, the use of bad general character appears as
originally allowable,-fitting, as it does, a more primitive notion of human nature. In
England, it was used without question to the latter part of the 1700s. .. ." 3A WIG-
MORE, supra note 5, § 923, at 728 (1970).
19. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 188 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
(describing general rule of exclusion).
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prove a criminal defendant's out of court conduct 2° in Michelson v.
United States.21 To simplify greatly, the common law did not allow
the prosecution to offer character evidence in its case-in-chief to
prove that the defendant was the sort of person who would have
committed the crime.22 The defendant, however, was permitted to
offer character evidence on her own behalf in the form of reputa-
tion to prove her innocence of the crime,23 and the prosecution was
permitted to "rebut" such evidence either by calling its own wit-
nesses to testify concerning the defendant's character using reputa-
tion evidence, or by cross-examining defendant's character witness,
by inquiring whether the witness had ever heard of specified in-
stances in which the defendant's behavior was inconsistent with the
witness's report of the defendant's reputation.24 Even under these
limited circumstances, the trial court retained broad discretion to
limit the number of character witnesses and limit their cross-
examination.25
The drafters of the Federal Rules adopted this arguably
flawed system virtually wholesale, simply adding that where the
common law restricted a party to the use of reputation evidence,
the party could now employ both reputation and opinion
evidence.26
While the primary exception to the character ban thus dealt with
the character of the defendant, both at common law and under the
Federal Rules, a party was sometimes allowed to prove the alleged
victim's character.27 Along similar lines, many states at common
20. Such use of character evidence was (and is) almost entirely forbidden in civil
cases. See id. § 189.
21. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
22. Id. at 475-76.
23. Id. at 476.
24. Id. at 479. For example, the prosecution might ask a character witness who has
testified to the defendant's peaceable nature whether the witness had ever heard that
the defendant had been involved in a fight in a bar.
25. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 480. In addition, if the prosecution wishes to cross-
examine a character witness by asking if she had ever heard of a particular instance of
conduct, it must demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the event occurred. Id. at
481 n.18. Finally, the common law practice was to instruct the jury about the limited
admissibility of the evidence. Id. at 484-85.
26. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), 405(a). There is a fairly strong indication that by
allowing opinion evidence of character, the drafters of the Federal Rules were actu-
ally returning to a practice allowed early in the common law development of evidence
rules. See 7 WIGMORE, supra note 5 §§ 1985-86; FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory commit-
tee's note.
27. The common law, for example, generally allowed a homicide defendant who
claimed self-defense to offer evidence of the victim's violent character. See 1A JOHN
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 63, at 1350 (Peter Tillers rev.
19951
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law permitted the defendant to offer evidence of an alleged rape
victim's unchaste character.28
Why did the common law so strictly regulate the use of character
evidence as circumstantial proof of out-of-court conduct? In Mich-
elson,29 Justice Jackson summed up the reason in his opinion for
the Court:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unani-
mously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any
kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a
probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant
with a presumption of good character, but it simply closes the
whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the
prosecutions' case-in-chief .... The inquiry is not rejected be-
cause character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh
too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to pre-
judge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair oppor-
tunity to defendant against a particular charge. The overriding
policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative
value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to
prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue
prejudice. 30
Somewhat more completely, Wigmore's most recent reviser states
five basic rationales for the prohibition: (1) such evidence has little
probative value; (2) it "diverts the jury's attention from the merits
of the case by inducing it to punish or reward a party for being
good or bad in general;" (3) adverse character evidence saddles
one involved in legal proceedings with disabilities because of previ-
ous misconduct; (4) the use of such evidence "violates a social com-
mitment to the thesis that each person remains mentally free and
autonomous at every point in his life;" and (5) it is a senseless
product of history.31
1983). Under the Federal Rules, the defendant in a criminal case is permitted to offer
evidence of a pertinent trait of the alleged victim's character, and the prosecution may
rebut that evidence. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). (The exception is not limited to homi-
cide cases.) And the prosecution is permitted to offer evidence of an alleged homi-
cide victim's character for peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor. Id.
28. See 1A WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 62. This matter is discussed more fully
infra note 116 and accompanying text.
29. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
30. Id. at 475-76 (footnotes and citations omitted).
31. 1A WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 54.1, at 1150-51. Tillers' reference to the au-
tonomy thesis probably refers to the philosophical position that an individual's nature
is not immutable-that people can change their fundamental nature-and that it is
morally wrong to assume that they have not.
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This general position about the restrictions on character to prove
conduct was and remains most influential. The Advisory Commit-
tee cited Michelson as support for its decision to adopt virtually all
of the common law rules governing this use of character.32 The
same can be found in other places such as the California Law Revi-
sion Commission's commentary on the California Evidence
Code.33
The rationale for the position restricting this use of character evi-
dence actually seems to have two prongs. The first prong concerns
the potential for unfair prejudice. Simply put, so-called character
"traits" are extremely weak predictors of conduct. This has long
been known in the psychological world, which began to reject "trait
theory" many decades ago.34 Thus, character evidence-even spe-
cific instances of conduct unless they were nearly identical to the
one at issue in the case-is of very low probative value. The prob-
lem, however, is that, psychological learning to the contrary
notwithstanding, character evidence carries a very high intuitive
value.35 This high intuitive quality raises the distinct possibility
that the jury will greatly overvalue character evidence as a predic-
tor of conduct, and make an inaccurate assessment of the facts. As
a result, character evidence risks destroying the truth-determina-
32. FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory committee's note.
33. In its commentary to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966), the Commission
wrote that in civil cases, the rule excludes evidence of character to prove conduct
because
First, character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudi-
cial. Second, character evidence tends to distract the trier of fact from the
main question of what actually happened on the particular occasion and per-
mits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man
because of their respective characters. Third, introduction of character evi-
dence may result in confusion of issues and require extended collateral
inquiry.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 Law Revision Comm'n comment.
34. The psychological literature concerning character is surveyed in Susan M. Da-
vies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct. A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM.
L. BULL. 504, 511-23 (1991); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Con-
duct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26-29
(1987). Both works discuss the decline of trait theory and the modem acceptance of a
blend of "situationism" (which permits predictions of human to conduct to be based
only on evidence of behavior in prior situations identical in nearly all particulars to
the one at issue) and the existence of generalized "traits," with greatest emphasis on
the former.
35. See generally Leonard, supra note 34 (addressing the intuitive value of charac-
ter evidence, and how that might affect our decision concerning the proper rules for
its admission).
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tion function of the trial, a very high cost for evidence of low pro-
bative value.36
The second prong of the rationale begins with the deeply in-
grained (nearly constitutional) notion that a person should be tried
based on what she did in a particular situation rather than for her
general character. When a jury hears evidence of the bad character
of a person, there is always a legitimate concern that the jury will
render harsh decisions against that person not because the person
is responsible in the situation at issue, but simply because she is
bad. This concern is particularly relevant when the character evi-
dence consists of prior bad acts, some of which may even have
gone unpunished.
For both of these reasons, the law has chosen to err, if at all, on
the side of excluding character, except in narrow circumstances,
when offered as circumstantial evidence of extrajudicial behavior.
From the common law through the codification movement, there
has been little change in the character evidence rules, and the
changes that have occurred have consisted of mere tinkering.37
III. The Dual Quality of the Federal Rules: Conserving
Common Law and Effectuating Political Policy
A. The Intent of the Drafters To Preserve the Common Law of
Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence hardly represented a radical de-
parture from the general form and content of the common law as it
had evolved by the late 1960s. On the contrary, they are the prod-
uct of a fundamentally conservative codification effort. The Rules
resulted from the Advisory Committee's desire to codify existing
practice and to achieve uniformity where practice diverged among
the federal courts.38 Congress's involvement in the process did not
36. Given its low probative value, character evidence also tends to lengthen and
overcomplicate the trial, a result that creates a risk of confusing the jury and, once
again, contributing to the rendering of an inaccurate verdict.
37. The broadening of proof to include opinion evidence where the common law
allowed only reputation is of little practical significance.
38. For a history of the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see 21 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5006 (1977). Particularly telling was the comment of Albert Jenner,
Chair of the Advisory Committee, that the Committee was not "inclined to give the
family jewels away or tip or rock the laws of evidence." HEARINGS ON PROPOSED
RULES OF EVIDENCE, BEFORE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITrEE ON THE REFORM OF THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 9 3D CONG., 1st
Sess., ser. 2, (1973), at 79.
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change this general approach to codification. As one treatise
states:
What was accomplished by the Congressional intervention? In
terms of the substance of the rules as finally enacted, the answer
is "not much." . . . For the most part, Congress accepted the
basic assumptions of the Advisory Committee and the notion
that the primary purpose of the Rules was to achieve uniformity,
not to reform the law of evidence.39
In most respects, the drafters of the Federal Rules simply
adopted the common law rules. The basic structure of the Federal
Rules reflects that of the common law. The hearsay rule, for exam-
ple, Was left essentially intact, with only minor (and largely techni-
cal) adjustments in its definition,4° and only slight expansion of its
exceptions.41 And although the Rules do reflect a faith in the trial
courts by granting rather broad "discretion" with respect to many
provisions,42 the Rules merely expanded a power that already ex-
isted at common law.43
The conservatism of the drafters is most strikingly reflected in
situations in which the research of other disciplines (principally
psychology) strongly suggests that the assumptions supporting the
39. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 38, at 108 (footnotes omitted).
40. FED. R. EvID. 801(d) (excepting from the definition of hearsay rather than
enacting as exceptions admissions and certain prior statements). See Tome v. United
States, No. 93-6892, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 469 (Jan. 10, 1995) (holding that a prior consis-
tent statement must precede a motive to falsify).
41. FED. R. EvID. 803-804.
42. For discussion of the flexibility of the Federal Rules and the power this gives
to trial courts, see David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 937 (1990); Thomas R. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413 (1989); Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in
the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1097 (1984).
43. It was well recognized at common law, for example, that a trial court had au-
thority to exclude relevant evidence when the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by several dangers, including that of unfair prejudice. See,
e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 114 A.2d 270, 270 (1921) ("The test therefore to determine the
admissibility of relevant facts capable of exciting prejudice is to inquire whether the
prejudice they will excite will be so great as to overbalance any assistance they may be
to the trier"). In 1954, McCormick wrote:
[R]elevance is not always enough. There may remain the question, is its
value worth what it costs. There are several counterbalancing factors which
may move the court to exclude relevant circumstantial evidence if they out-
weigh its probative value.
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 152, at 319
(1954). See also M.C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 12-15
(1956).
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common law rules were questionable, at best, and simply wrong, at
worst. Two examples amply demonstrate this point.
First, the common law hearsay exception for "dying declara-
tions" was based on the assumption that such statements are likely
sincere because a person who believes she is dying generally would
not lie.44 But such an assumption does not always hold true.45
Among other things, the assumption generalizes among cultures.46
Further, even in cultures in which the assumption accurately de-
scribes the beliefs and behavior of many people, it does not reflect
the beliefs of all people. It is thus very difficult, and most risky, to
generalize about the heightened sincerity of dying declarations.
Though the variations among people within and between cultures
were well known by the time the Federal Rules were drafted, the
44. Probably the best known statement of this view was made in an eighteenth
century English case:
[T]he general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is, that
they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death, and when every hope of this world is gone: when every motive to
falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful consid-
erations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn, and so awful, is considered
by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a
positive oath administered in a Court of Justice.
Rex v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (K.B. 1789). Wigmore
saw three components to the rationale:
(1) The declarant, being at the point of death, "must lose the use of all de-
ceit" - in Shakespeare's phrase. There is no longer any temporal self-serv-
ing purpose to be furthered. (2) If a belief exists in a punishment soon to be
inflicted by a Higher Power upon human ill-doing, the fear of this punish-
ment will outweigh any possible motive for deception, and will even counter-
balance the inclination to gratify a possible spirit of revenge. (3) Even
without such a belief, there is a natural and instinctive awe at the approach
of an unknown future-a physical revulsion common to all men, irresistible,
and independent of theological belief.
5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1443, at 302 (James
H. Chadbourn rev. 1974).
45. Wigmore, for example, recognized that "the declarant may exhibit such strong
feelings of hatred or revenge that the effect of all the ... influences appears to be
lacking. If he is in such a frame of mind, the supposed guarantee of trustworthiness
fails... " Id.
46. To the extent the rationale relies on religious or cultural beliefs, it is also sub-
ject to significant variation among and within cultures. One author described a com-
mon practice in the Punjab region of India in which "a person mortally wounded
frequently makes a statement bringing all his hereditary enemies on to the scene at
the time of his receiving his wound, thus using his last opportunity to do them an
injury". SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENG-
LAND, Vol. 1, at 448 (1883). The author also quotes a remark made by a native of
Madras: "Such evidence ought never to be admitted in any case. What motive for
telling the truth can any man possibly have when he is at the point of death?" Id., at
449.
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Rules' did not make any effort to modify the foundation facts so as
to separate those situations in which the evidence carries additional
credibility from those in which it does not. On the contrary, they
flagged the issue, only to ignore it.47
The second example is the "excited utterance" or "spontaneous
exclamation" exception to the hearsay rule.48 That exception rests
primarily on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that when one
observes or takes part in a ."startling event," one's awareness is
heightened, enhancing the accuracy of the observation.49 Second,
and more importantly, it is assumed that a startling event "tempo-
rarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free
of conscious fabrication. ' 50 But psychologists showed decades ago
that neither assumption is justified; exciting events actually warp
our perceptions, and some people are capable of fabricating a story
to suit their purposes in amazingly short periods of time.51 As with
dying declarations, the Advisory Committee was well aware of the
data undercutting the validity of the assumptions underlying the
excited utterances exception,52 but the Committee chose to ignore
the evidence and proposed the rule largely as it had come to be
recognized at common law.
In regard to other rules, the drafters were either unaware of sub-
stantial research contradicting the common law rules or knew of
such research but chose not even to cite it. The entire set of 'rules
governing evidence of character to prove extrajudicial conduct in
conformity is probably the best example, and is particularly perti-
nent to the problem at issue in this Essay. Those rules are based
entirely on the assumptions of so-called "trait theory," which posits
that a person's moral behavior is the product of'discrete "character
traits" that operate consistently across situations. It might be as-
sumed, for example, that an individual possesses a character for
47. The Advisory Committee wrote: "While the original religious justification for
the exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the years, it can
scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are present." FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
48. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
49. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law
of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 437 (1928).
50. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee's note. See also 6 JOHN H. WiG-
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1747, at 195 (James H. Chadbourn
rev. 1976).
51. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 49, at 436-38.
52. The Advisory Committee wrote that "the theory of [the excited utterance ex-
ception] has been criticized on the ground that excitement impairs accuracy of obser-
vation as well as eliminating conscious fabrication." FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory
committee's note.
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peacefulness, and that such trait would make it unlikely that she
would react violently in any particular situation.53 The common
law character evidence rules are based squarely on this theory; in
those situations in which character evidence would be admissible to
prove conduct in conformity, the evidence would be in the form of
"traits." And when it could be offered, the evidence could not gen-
erally take the form of specific instances of conduct to exemplify
the trait.
Trait theory is intuitively plausible,54 but by the end of the first
half of the century it was already quite clear that the theory was
simply wrong. Study after study demonstrated that the concept of
immutable character "traits" is largely illusory-that predictions of
behavior based on generalized "traits" are highly inaccurate." The
modern view is that a far better way to predict a person's moral
behavior in a particular situation is to know how the person acted
in other virtually identical situations5 6 and that the very best pre-
dictor would combine a healthy dose of information about past sit-
uations with a bit of information about generalized character
"traits. '57 Thus, to know whether a particular person likely was the
aggressor in a barroom fight, it would be useful primarily to know
how she reacted in similar threatening situations, and also to have
an idea of her general disposition toward violence.
This information about the flaws in trait theory was readily avail-
able to the members of the Advisory Committee when they
adopted the Rules 58 but the Committee either did not bother to
locate it or knew of it but chose not to cite it. Instead, the Advi-
sory Committee proposed rules governing character evidence as
53. See GORDON ALLPORT, PERSONALITY - A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETA-
TION (1937). Allport stated: "Traits are not creations in the mind of the observer, nor
are they verbal fictions; they are here accepted as biophysical facts, actual
psychophysical dispositions ...." Id. at 339.
54. The present author has explored the possible significance of the intuitive value
of character trait evidence. See Leonard, supra note 34.
55. See Leonard, supra note 34, at 26-31.
56. This is a short-hand description of the theory known as "situationism." See
Bowers, Situationism in Psychology: An Analysis and Critique, 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 397
(1973). Perhaps the best known proponent of situationism is Mischel, who used the
term "social behavior theory." WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT
(1968).
57. See Davies, supra note 34, at 518-19. The author writes: "The trait-versus-
situation controversy in the field of personality and social psychology has produced
widespread agreement that behavior is simultaneously a function of disposition and
situation, and their mutual interaction." (footnote omitted.)
58. Much of the psychological research had been conducted before the Federal
Rules were drafted, and certainly before they were enacted.
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proof of extrajudicial conduct that were virtually identical to those
at common law, and the Committee's proposals were enacted with-
out substantive change.5 9
B. Politics and the Federal Rules
To say that the Federal Rules did not depart significantly from
the common law is not to say that the Rules are "neutral" or do not
reflect the political process. To the contrary, a number of the rules
were clearly the product of political forces. Several examples will
demonstrate this point.
1. Admissibility of opinions on "ultimate issues"
The 1984 amendment to Rule 704, the rule, which otherwise al-
lows an opinion witness to testify in a way that "embraces an ulti-
mate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, demonstrates the
impact on political debate on the Federal Rules." 6 In 1984, a new
subdivision was added to Rule 704 providing:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion
or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the
mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime
charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are mat-
ters for the trier of fact alone.6'
This amendment did not materialize out of thin air. It was a direct
response to the public outrage over the insanity defense, a reaction
that emerged following the jury verdict in the trial of John Hinkley,
whose televised 1981 attempted assassination of President Reagan
left Reagan seriously injured and permanently disabled White
House Press Secretary James Brady.62 The jury found Hinkley not
guilty by reason of insanity in a trial featuring the typical battle of
experts on the question of his mental state at the time of the shoot-
ing. The amendment was part of the Insanity Reform Defense Act
59. FED. R. EvID. 404(a), 405(a).
60. FED. R. EvID. 704(b), added by P.L. 98-473, Oct. 12, 1984.
61. Id.
62. See David Cohen, Note, Punishing the Insane: Restriction of Expert Psychiat-
ric Testimony by Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 541, 542 & n.7
(1988) (referring to an ABC News poll which found that 83 percent of the public
believed Hinkley's acquittal to have been unjust). For additional discussion of the
effects of the Hinkley case on the insanity defense, see Jonathan B. Sallet, After Hink-
ley: the Insanity Defense Reexamined, 94 YALE L.J. 1545 (1985) (reviewing LINCOLN
CAPLAN, THE INSANrry DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINKLEY, JR. (1984)).
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of 1984,63 which principally declared the defense of insanity to be
an affirmative defense and shifted the burden of proof on the issue
to the defendant. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
does not explicitly refer to the Hinkley case or to the public's reac-
tion to the verdict. It does, however, refer to the "confusing spec-
tacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly
contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found
by the trier of fact and it is abundantly clear that the fallout from
the Hinkley case was the impetus for the amendment." 64
Rule 704(b) thus represents a situation in which the political pro-
cess led to amendment of the Federal Rules. But while the amend-
ment might reflect questionable judgment,65 it can hardly be
considered revolutionary. The common law had generally ex-
cluded opinion evidence on an ultimate issue.66 Further, though
the Advisory Committee noted a "trend to abandon the rule com-
pletely67 and drafted a rule liberalizing the common law, some un-
certainty remained about the scope of permissible opinions under
the original version of Rule 704.68
Moreover, Rule 704(b) makes no fundamental change in the ba-
sic structure of the common law of evidence or of the Federal
Rules. The amendment represents an incremental reversal of the
liberalization represented by the original rule rather than a sweep-
ing change in the way a particular class of evidence is treated or in
the structure of the trial. Indeed, Rule 704(b) does not affect the
right of a psychiatric expert to offer an opinion concerning the
mental state of the defendant in a criminal case; the expert could
still testify, for example, that the defendant suffered from a particu-
lar mental disease. What is excluded is Only the legal conclusion
that might follow from such a diagnosis-that, for example, the de-
fendant did not possess the requisite mental state for the crime at
63. Title II § 402(a), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984), codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1988).
64. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412.
65. See Cohen, supra note 62, at 560-61 (proposing repeal of Rule 704(b)).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498 (1935). The common law
rule is discussed in 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 12, at 47-48.
67. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note (citing illustrative cases).
68. What is meant by opinions that "embrace[ ] an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact" is not altogether clear. See, e.g., United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135
(2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the trial court should have excluded a witness's opinion
that was framed in terms of the relevant statutory and regulatory language governing
the defendants' behavior).
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issue.69 This is not much of a departure, if any, from more tradi-
tional practice.70
2. The rule excluding certain plea bargaining evidence
A second example of the involvement of political positions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence can be found in Rule 410, which gov-
erns the admission of evidence of withdrawn guilty pleas, pleas of
nolo contendere, and certain statements made in connection with
the entry of such pleas and in the course of plea bargaining.71 Un-
like most of the Federal Rules, this rule was debated extensively in
Congress, went through many drafts, and was in fact enacted in one
form but revised before that version ever became effective. In the
case of the plea bargaining rule, moreover, the political process in-
volved not only the courts and Congress, but also the Executive
branch and some other interest groups. A good part of that debate
centered on the question of which factual statements made by the
defendant in the course of plea bargaining negotiations should be
excluded from the rule.
The complex history of Rule 410 can only be summarized
here.72  In 1969, the Advisory 'Committee circulated its first
69. The Senate Report states that "expert psychiatric testimony would be limited
to presenting and explaining their diagnoses, such as whether the defendant had a
severe mental disease or defect and what the characteristics of such a disease or de-
fect, if any, may have been." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1983). As the
authors of the current edition of MCCORMICK write:
Presumably the medical expert is able to answer.the questions, "Was the
accused suffering from a mental disease or defect?"; "Explain the character-
istics of the mental disease and defect."; and "Was his act the product of that
disease or defect?" However, the expert may not answer the question "Was
the accused able to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts", or "Was
the accused able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts."
1 MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 12, at 52.
70. The MCCORMICK authors write:
A court which does not ban opinion on the ultimate issue as such may never-
theless condemn a question phrased in terms of a legal criterion not ade-
quately defined by the questioner so as to be correctly understood by
laymen, the question being interpreted by the court as calling for a legal
opinion.
Id. at 50. The authors do not believe such questions raise significant problems, how-
ever. As they write, "In a jurisdiction where there is no general rule against opinions
on the ultimate issue, it seems that a request by the adversary that the questioner
define his terms should be the only recourse." Id. at 51.
71. FED. R. EvID. 410.
72. For detailed review of the legislative history of the Federal Rule, see 2 CHRIS-
TOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 142 (2d ed.
1994); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
410[01] (1986); 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
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draft.73 Following objections from the antitrust bar, a second Advi-
sory Committee version broadening the rule's exclusionary provi-
sions was published in 1971, before the rule was submitted to
Congress.74 The revised proposed rule expanded exclusion to
statements made in connection with pleas or offers, and also made
the evidence inadmissible in any civil or criminal proceeding, with-
out limiting exclusion to situations in which the evidence is offered
against the person who made the plea or offer.75 The United States
Department of Justice objected strenuously to this revision, argu-
ing primarily that statements made freely and voluntarily in open
court should not be excluded. 76 The Advisory Committee again
revised its draft, limiting exclusion to situations in which the evi-
dence is offered in a proceeding against the person who made the
plea or offer, but still excluding statements made in connection
with pleas or offers.77 Though the Justice Department continued to
object to certain aspects of the rule, the Advisory Committee de-
clined to alter its proposal, and the rule was promulgated by the
Supreme Court in this form.78
Congress debated the rule at length. Much of that debate took
place against the backdrop of certain proposed changes in the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme
Court. One proposal concerned changes in Rule 11 to deal with
plea bargaining.79 Part of the proposal would have added to the
rule the same language that the Advisory Committee had proposed
for Federal Rule of Evidence 410.80 The Senate, however, favored
a version of the rule which would permit some plea bargaining
statements to be offered to impeach the individual making such
statements.8 1 A conference committee decided to defer resolution
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5341 (1980). Some commentators note
that "[tihe statutory history behind [the rule] is a murky fog which may well obscure
more than it illuminates." 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 142, at 120 (2d ed. 1994).
73. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 4-10, 46 F.R.D. 161, 241-42 (1969).
74. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 72, 410[01], at 410-26-27 & nn.7-8.
75. Id.
76. See Letter From Richard G. Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General to the
Honorable Albert B. Maris (Aug. 9, 1971), reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. 33,648,
33,651.
77. 2 PLI FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE, at 27 (4th ed. 1972).
78. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 410, 56 F.R.D. 183, 228-29 (1972).
79. Proposed FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 11(e)(6), 62 F.R.D. 271, 276-77 (1974).
80. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
81. The Senate version included the following sentence:
This rule shall not apply to the introduction of voluntary and reliable state-
ments made in court on the record in connection with any of the foregoing
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of the differences until the proposed amendments to the criminal
rules had been considered. The committee then recommended
passage of the Senate version of the evidence rule, but also recom-
mended a provision delaying the effective date of the rule so that
its language would be superseded by any inconsistent amendment
to the criminal rules that might later be enacted.82 This decision, in
effect, delayed final consideration of the issues raised by the com-
peting versions passed by the House and Senate. Both chambers
then adopted the conference version of the rule. As it happened,
subsequent developments prevented this rule from ever taking
effect.
Several months later, the House of Representatives passed an
amended version of the competing criminal rule. Despite objec-
tions by the Justice Department, this rule would not have permit-
ted impeachment of criminal defendants with statements they
made during plea bargaining. The Senate rejected this rule, instead
passing a version of the criminal rule much like the interpretation
of the proposed evidence rule it had previously passed. For im-
peachment purposes (or in a subsequent prosecution for perjury or
false statement), this rule would permit introduction of voluntary
and reliable statements (made in court on the record) in connec-
tion with pleas. The House refused to accede to the Senate ver-
sion, and the conference committee restored most of the version
passed by the House. The primary effect of this change was to dis-
allow use of plea bargaining statements for impeachment purposes.
This version of the criminal rules passed both chambers in July,
1975, and became effective almost immediately. At the end of
1975, the evidence rule was conformed to this language and went
into effect.8 3
pleas or offers where offered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent
prosecution of the declarant for perjury or false statement.
S. REP. No. 93-1227, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
82. H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1974).
83. As originally enacted, FED. R. EvID. 410, which is identical to FED. R. CRIM.
PROC. 11(e)(6), read in pertinent part as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of a plea of guilty, later
withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or
nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements
made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or of-
fers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person
who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in
connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of
nolo contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime
charged or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for per-
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This did not end the saga of Rule 410. Not long after Evidence
Rule 410 and Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e)(6) were enacted,
there was some concern that the rules could be interpreted so as to
exclude admissions made at early stages of a criminal investigation.
Although the drafters of the rules did not intend such a result, 84
which would have made inadmissible a large number of admissions
in the criminal context, it was thought necessary to amend both
rules to delineate the scope of the exclusionary rule more clearly.
In 1978, the Rules of Criminal Procedure Advisory Committee
made such a proposal in a preliminary draft of an amendment to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), along with a recom-
mendation that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 be changed to con-
tain identical language, except for minor technical differences.
After some revision, the proposed amendments were transmitted
to the Supreme Court and became effective in December, 1980.85
jury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under
oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
84. "[I]t is apparent that none of the [drafters] had any such intention." 2 WEIN-
STEIN & BERGER, supra note 72, 1 410[08], at 410-54. The authors give the following
example:
The police apprehend a suspect bank robber and one of them says, after
giving the suspect his Miranda warnings: "Why don't you come clean, since
we have the goods on you anyway. Your cooperation will be made known to
the prosecutor and judge and you could well get a lesser plea or sentence."
The suspect then talks. Is this a "statement ... relevant to any ... pleas or
offers"? The answer should be no. The rule was not designed to apply to
this early investigative stage. At this stage, the normal rules to determine
whether the admissions were made voluntarily and without trickery should
apply.
Id. at 410-55.
85. FED. R. EvID. 410 now provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not,
in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who
made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussion:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure
regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney
for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plead of guilty or
which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another state-
ment made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and
the statement ought in fairness be considered, contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a
criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the
defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.
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This language clarifies the reach of the exclusionary principle in
several ways. Most importantly, it limits exclusion of plea bargain-
ing discussions to those made to "an attorney for the prosecuting
authority."8 6 This amendment was designed to assure that only
statements made to a prosecuting authority will qualify for exclu-
sion.
The complex drafting history of Rule 410 thus reveals substantial
debate over the admissibility of plea bargaining statements.
Though the Senate wished to make such statements admissible for
impeachment purposes, the House view disallowing such use, ulti-
mately prevailed. 7 At the same time, however, not all statements
that might be deemed relevant to an offer to plead guilty (or nolo
contendere) qualify for exclusion. The 1980 amendment was in-
tended to make clear that the exclusionary rule was to have limited
application.
The debate over the plea bargaining rule clearly had political im-
plications. Had the rule broadly excluded factual statements made
in the course of plea bargaining, police and prosecutors would have
been denied what they consider to be highly probative, and often
essential evidence. A law-and-order minded Congress and Justice
Department found the necessary support to impose limits on the
exclusionary provision, and though the ultimate result was not all
that the law enforcement community wanted, it did represent a
reasonable compromise.
But the political process did not create a plea bargaining rule
substantially different from the common law rule. While very early
cases were in disarray as to the admissibility of withdrawn guilty
pleas, 8 the tide turned decidedly in favor of exclusion when the
Supreme Court visited the issue in 1927.89 Further, support for a
rule excluding at least some statements made in the course of plea
bargaining grew in the first half of the twentieth century. It is
likely, in fact, that before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the larger number of courts considering the admissibility of
86. Id.
87. See 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 142, at 124 (asserting as a
point of "overriding significance" that the drafting history of this rule and FED. R.
CRIM. PROC. 11(e)(6) "demonstrate the intent of Congress to foreclose altogether the
use of plea bargaining statements to impeach the defendant by contradicting his later
trial testimony"); United States v. Mezzanatto, No. 93-1340, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 692
(Jan. 18, 1995) (protection against impeachment may be voluntarily waived).
88. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ervine, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 30 (1839) (admitting evi-
dence of defendant's withdrawn guilty plea); Commonwealth v. Lannan, 95 Mass. 563
(1866) (excluding such evidence).
89. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
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statements made in compromise negotiations had decided that ex-
clusion was the more appropriate course." Also predating the
Federal Rules, several other bodies, including the American Bar
Association,91 the American Law Institute 92 and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, proposed exclu-
sionary rules covering plea bargaining statements.93 Even if a
political effort to admit all plea bargaining statements as part of
Rule 410 had been successful, this would hardly have worked a
fundamental change in the basic structure and assumptions under-
lying the Federal Rules. Thus, Federal Rule 410 did not represent
a revolution.
3. The admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment
purposes
The most controversial provision of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence was Rule 609, which regulates the admission of prior convic-
tions to impeach the credibility of a witness.94 Congress debated
this rule more than any other,95 and ultimately reached a compro-
mise that required substantial amendment after only a short time.
Impeachment by prior conviction is a character evidence rule.
The conviction represents a particularly reliable judgment 96 that
the witness did in fact engage in a prior act of dishonesty that cir-
cumstantially evidences her bad character for honesty. The
factfinder in the present trial is then allowed to draw the inference
that it is somewhat more likely the person would lie as a witness
than would someone who had not been convicted of the crime.
90. See Commonwealth v. Cohen, 2 A.2d 560, 564-65 (1938) (noting a "plain divi-
sion of authority," but stating that "the apparent weight of authority [is) against the
admissibility of" communications made in plea bargaining); Moulder v. State, 289
N.E.2d 522, 525-26 & n.10 (1972) (citing Cohen and reaching the same conclusion).
91. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.4, at 77 (1968).
92. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 350.7 (Proposed Official
Draft 1975).
93. UNIF. R. CRIM. PROC. 441(e) (1987).
94. FED. R. EvID. 609.
95. The floor debate in the House of Representatives "far exceeded that relating
to any other provision in all the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence." Victor Gold,
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2303 (1994). The author notes that this debate alone
consumed nine pages of the Congressional Record, whereas the entire debate on the
hearsay rule and its exceptions consumed only five pages. Id. at n.45.
96. The judgment of the factfinder is highly reliable because in order to find the
defendant guilty of the crime, the factfinder must have been convinced of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
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Of course, some crimes are more probative of truthfulness than
others.97 A conviction for perjury, for example, is particularly pro-
bative because it represents a prior instance of dishonesty under
oath-the very possibility being raised in the present situation. A
prior conviction for assault and battery, on the other hand, carries
little probative value on the question of honesty, because the crime
generally is committed in the absence of any act of dishonesty.
Some crimes, such as embezzlement, fall in the middle; they are
usually committed with a degree of dishonesty, but unlike other
crimes such as perjury, are not fundamentally acts of dishonesty.
There is, of course, substantial disagreement about which crimes
are probative of a person's truthfulness, and about the relative pro-
bative value of particular crimes on credibility. It should not be
surprising, therefore, that a great deal of the Congressional debate
over Rule 609 centered around which crimes should be admissible
to impeach, and over the amount of discretion the trial court
should have in regulating the admission of this evidence. More
fundamentally, that debate centered on two sharply competing ide-
ologies: society's interest in convicting guilty persons, and the ac-
cused's interest in receiving a fair trial and in being acquitted when
innocent.98 The task of forging a compromise between these com-
peting values is hindered by the fact that the effect of conviction
evidence on the accuracy of factfinding is not known, 99 and that
conviction evidence has been shown to have a significant impact on
the outcome of criminal trials.10°
Congress's effort to reach a compromise led to adoption of a rule
that, as one author has described it, "incorporat[es] no less than
three balancing tests, two references to fairness, one to justice, and
several other undefined terms, [and] leaves the task of resolving
the many questions raised by these policy conflicts to the
courts."'10 1 The legislative history of Rule 609 is too complex to
97. "Patently the force of the theory must depend on the nature of the prior crime.
That a witness is a convicted perjurer gives more reason to be suspicious of his present
testimony than that he has been convicted of drunken driving." 2 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 416, at 549 (2d ed.
1982).
98. Gold, supra note 95, at 2310.
99. See id. at 2310-16.
100. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966)
(showing significantly higher conviction rate when defendant's prior criminal record is
disclosed than when it is not).
101. Gold, supra note 95, at 2296.
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review here.10 2 It is fair to say, however, that the debate took place
along highly ideological lines, and that the imperfect compromise
ultimately reached was plainly a political one. As originally en-
acted, the rule divided crimes into two classes,10 3 those involving
dishonesty or false statement (regardless of the applicable punish-
ment), and those punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year. The first class of crimes was to be admitted without
question,1°4 and the second class was to be admitted if "the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant."'15 Other parts of
the rule governed such questions as the admission of older convic-
tions, the effect of pardons, the admissibility of juvenile adjudica-
tions, and the admissibility of convictions under appeal at the time
of the current trial.10 6
The language governing the use of serious crimes that are not
crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement" proved particu-
larly confusing, especially in its reference to the "defendant,"
which could be interpreted to treat civil defendants and civil plain-
tiffs differently. 0 7 In 1988, an amendment process began, and in
1990, Congress adopted a new and very different rule governing
the admission of serious crimes not involving dishonesty or false
statement. 08 For the purpose of determining the admissibility of
these crimes to impeach, the new rule provides a somewhat restric-
102. For a full treatment of the legislative history of Rule 609, see 28 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 6131 (1993).
103. Implicitly, the rule governs a third class of crimes, misdemeanors that are not
crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement." Those crimes are not admissible to
impeach.
104. Some courts held that the trial court had no discretion to exclude evidence of
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 703
F.2d 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983).
105. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (now superseded).
106. FED. R. EVID. 609(b)-(e).
107. The Supreme Court made an effort to interpret the rule in Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
108. Some surprise has been expressed that Congress exhibited little interest in the
amendment even though it created a very different rule governing matters about
which there had been a "vigorous and protracted struggle less than a generation
before." Gold, supra note 95, at 2309.
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tive standard for the criminal defendant witness,1°9 and a much
more lenient one for all other witnesses.110
To what extent did the political debate over the prior crimes im-
peachment rule alter the landscape that had existed at common
law? Prior to the enactment of Rule 609, as one author has writ-
ten, there had been "an astonishing variety of views among the fed-
eral courts, as among American courts generally, on the
impeachment of a witness by inquiry about prior criminal convic-
tions."11' As the author explains,
Support could have been found in the federal cases for each of
the following positions: a witness may be impeached by inquiry
about any conviction of crime, whether felony or misdemeanor;
felonies may be shown but misdemeanors may not; only crimes
involving moral turpitude may be shown; any felony may be
shown but misdemeanors only if they involve moral turpitude;
all felonies and those misdemeanors amounting to crimen false;
or that only crimes resting on dishonest conduct may be
shown."1
2
Given this common law history, it is not surprising that members of
Congress expressed divergent views on the proper scope of the
rule. But neither the eventual compromise reached in Congress
nor the amended version of the rule departs from traditions well-
represented at common law. On the contrary, the rule fits neatly in
the middle of the common law views. Like the rules governing the
admissibility of expert opinion on the ultimate issue and plea evi-
dence, the prior conviction rule does not work a basic structural
change in the evidence law.
4. The "rape shield" rule
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were first enacted, they did
not contain a provision protecting the privacy and reputations of
alleged victims of rape and other sexual assaults. This was true
despite the fact that in the mid-1970s, a national debate had begun
about the need for such legislation, and that by the end of 1975,
thirteen states had already enacted rules protecting these inter-
109. As to the criminal defendant, such crimes shall be admitted "if the court deter-
mines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused." FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1).
110. Other witnesses may be impeached by such a crime "subject to Rule 403," the
general probative value prejudicial impact rule, under which prejudicial effect must
substantially outweigh probative value for the conviction to be excluded. Id.
111. 2 WRIG-rr, supra note 97, at 549.
112. Id. at 550-51 (footnotes omitted).
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ests. 113 The primary contours of the debate have been laid out ex-
tensively in the literature and are well known." 4 At common law,
the character for chastity of an alleged rape victim was considered
relevant and admissible evidence in the alleged attacker's trial. 1 5
Earlier commentators also agreed that such evidence is relevant.116
While the courts disagreed to some extent about the type of char-
acter evidence admissible to prove the alleged victim's character,
and about the means by which evidence of prior behavior by the
alleged victim (if admissible at all) could be proven, the general
rule allowed fairly wide inquiry into the person's character. In
most instances, of course, the evidence was offered to prove
consent.
Many people perceived that such a rule permitted the defendant
to shift the focus from his conduct to that of the alleged victim,
113. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 72, § 5381, at 483 & n.2. The authors
suggest that one reason there was no significant Congressional consideration of a rape
shield rule was that few rape cases are tried in federal courts. This would have meant
organizations interested in reform legislation would not have felt a need to turn signif-
icant attention to Congress. Id. at 483-84.
114. Even as of the late 1970s, numerous works had appeared in the popular press.
See, e.g., sources cited at 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5238, at 410 n.1 (1978). In addi-
tion, the law reviews by that time had published extensive commentary concerning
the rules regulating the admission of evidence concerning a testifying rape victim. See
id. at 410-11 n.2. The commentary has continued in the years since. See, e.g., sources
cited at 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 72, at 412 [10]-[12].
115. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 193, at 822. As one court stated:
This class of evidence is admissible for the purpose of tending to show the
nonprobability of resistance upon the part of the prosecutrix; for it is cer-
tainly more probable that a woman who has done these things voluntarily in
the past would be much more likely to consent than one whose past reputa-
tion was without blemish, and whose personal conduct could not truthfully
be assailed.
People v. Johnson, 39 P. 622, 623 (1895). See also Gish v. Wisner, 288 F. 562 (5th Cir.
1923) ("in a prosecution or suit for an assault with intent to commit rape, the rule is
established by the great weight of authority that the general reputation for chastity of
the complaining witness, who claims to be the victim, is material as bearing upon the
vital question of her consent or nonconsent").
116. Wigmore, for example, believed that character for chastity in general, and spe-
cific instances of behavior in particular, is relevant to the issue of consent:
It is generally accepted.., that the bad character for chastity of the com-
plainant in a rape charge is relevant and admissible to show the probability
of her consent to the intercourse. In evidencing this character, may particu-
lar acts of the woman's unchastity be resorted to, as showing her to be a
person more prone than another to have consented?
No question of evidence has been more controverted. The Relevancy of
the fact is seldom doubted. ...
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 200, at 682 (3d ed. 1940) (em-
phasis in original).
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essentially putting the victim on trial rather than the defendant.
Evidence indicated that women were hesitant to report incidents of
rape because of their fear of being subjected to the invasion of pri-
vacy and humiliation involved in such a process. The rape shield
laws were intended to end the practice of putting victims on trial"
17
and thus increase the rate of reporting of rape and the successful
prosecution of rapists.
Though the state rules differ in many respects, 118 they generally
place strict limits on the use of specific instances of the alleged vic-
tim's sexual conduct (particularly conduct with persons other than
the defendant) on such issues as consent." 9 The rules generally
contain exceptions (common ones are evidence concerning the al-
leged victim's prior sexual behavior with the defendant, and evi-
dence of the alleged victim's sexual conduct with other persons to
explain the presence of semen, illness or injury). 2 ° In addition,
under some circumstances, the constitution requires that the evi-
dence be admitted.' 2 ' The exceptions, however, are rather narrow,
and in most cases, the character evidence will be excluded. The
statutes also generally specify procedures a party wishing to offer
character evidence under an exception must follow.
Between 1975 and 1977, a number of bills were introduced in
Congress to address these problems. 22 One bill, introduced in the
House in 1977,123 was amended and ultimately adopted late in 1978
as Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The rule was amended in 1988 so
117. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 72, 412[011, at 412[12]-[131 (noting
that the legislative history of the Federal Rule indicated a desire "to prevent the vic-
tim, rather than the defendant, from being put on trial"); David P. Bryden & Roger
C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 568
(1994) ("[r]ape shield laws are grounded not only in a desire for accurate verdicts, but
also in considerations of extrinsic policy. They are designed to protect victims from
unnecessary embarrasment and to encourage them to report rape").
118. The various forms are summarized in 1 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES ch. 22, at
3 (1987).
119. The rules generally disallow or restrict the use of reputation or opinion evi-
dence. See, e.g., HAW. R. EVID. 412 (forbidding the use of reputation or opinion
evidence of the alleged's victim's past sexual behavior); IDAHO R. EVID. 412 (similar);
N.M. R. EVID. 412 (restricting reputation and opinion evidence).
120. See 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 118, § 22, at 3.
121. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988), for a discussion of the Constitu-
tional implications surrounding Rape Shield Laws. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG,
MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL,
562-65 (1994).
122. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 72, § 5381, at 484.
123. H.R. 4727, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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as to clarify the offenses for which the rule applies. 124 As part of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,125
the same law which contains Proposed Rules 413 to 415, Rule 412
was again amended, effective December 1, 1994.126 The Federal
Rule is not markedly different from the rules in many states. As
recently amended, it generally forbids evidence of other sexual be-
havior of the alleged victim as well as evidence intended to prove
the alleged victim's sexual predisposition.12 7 The rule establishes
124. FED. R. EvID. 412.
125. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
126. The text of Rule 412 as recently amended is as follows:
(a) EVIDENCE GENERALLY INADMISSIBLE.-The following evidence
is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual
misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior; and
(2) evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.-
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise
admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged
victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused
was the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence;
(B) *evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged
victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual miscon-
duct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecu-
tion; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional
rights of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sex-
ual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is other-
wise admissible under these rules and its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of un-
fair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputa-
tion is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the
alleged victim.
(c) PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY.-
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must-
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is
offered unless the court, for good cause requires a different
time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or,
when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or
representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a
hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend
and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the
hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court or-
ders otherwise.
127. FED. R. EvID. 412(a).
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specific exceptions applicable to criminal cases,'128 and a more gen-
eralized exception for civil cases. 29 Procedures for admission of
evidence pursuant to the exceptions are also set forth.130
Clearly, the existence of Rule 412, and of similar rules in forty-
eight states,'131 can be attributed to the political process. Were it
not for general pressures brought to bear by the feminist move-
ment and prosecutors,'132 it is doubtful that Congress would have
acted in this area. 33 But did the rape shield rule work a basic
change in the law or in the structure of the evidence rules?
As to the changes in the law, the answer appears to be yes, but
with a caveat. If the practice before enactment of rape shield legis-
lation was to use the threat of revealing prior sexual history to dis-
courage reporting or testimony, 34 and if the threat was carried out
frequently in the event the victim complained and testified, 35 the
rape shield rules have indeed had an impact on the law and on the
practice of litigants because they prohibit most of the offending
conduct.
It is clear that courts already possessed the power under existing
rules to exclude much of this testimony. In particular, the court
has long had power to exclude evidence the probative value of
which is substantially outweighed by such dangers as unfair preju-
dice or confusion of issues.136 If prior sexual activity possesses low
probative value on the issue of consent, as has long been asserted,
128. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
129. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
130. FED. R. EvID. 412(c).
131. See 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURo, supra note 118, § 22.1, at 2 (reporting that
though the federal model has not been adopted widely by the states, all states except
Arizona and Utah have enacted rape shield statutes or rules. Even in those two
states, there is protection for victims. The Arizona Supreme Court has constructed a
rape shield rule from Arizona Rules 401 and 403 (counterparts to the same Federal
Rules).). See State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071 (Ariz. 1988). In Utah, the Advisory Com-
mittee believed the issues could better be dealt with under Rules 404 and 405 (coun-
terparts to the same Federal Rules). See 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURO, supra note 119, at
134.
132. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 72, § 5382, at 493 (noting that the rule
was "the product of an alliance between feminist groups and prosecutors").
133. It is worthy of note that FED. R. EVID. 412 passed the House with little debate,
and the Senate with no debate. Id. § 5381, at 484-85.
134. A substantial body of literature, much of it available at the. time Congress was
considering Rule 412, supports the claim that rape tends to be seriously underre-
ported. See id. § 5382, at 497-501. The authors note, however, that the relationship
between underreporting and the evidence rules has not been shown. Id. at 500-01.
135. There is some controversy about the extent of the problem that existed before
enactment of rape shield legislation. See id. at 496-97.
136. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403.
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then exclusion will often be justified on the ground that the evi-
dence adds little to the issues and only tends to distract and con-
fuse the jury (as well as to cause jurors holding particular moral
beliefs to punish the victim for her past behavior). In addition,
courts could read existing character rules as empowering them to
exclude prior sexual history on the ground that such conduct does
not reveal a "pertinent" trait of the alleged victim's character. 137
Thus, although the rape shield rules explicitly address the problem,
courts likely possess the power to exclude much of this evidence
under other provisions. 38
The second question (whether rape shield legislation altered the
general structure of evidence law) can be answered in the negative.
The rules do not fundamentally change long-held assumptions
about character evidence except insofar as they reject the general-
ization that a person's prior consensual sexual experience makes
her more likely to have consented in the present situation. That
assumption, however, was on the wane long before the rape shield
rules, and the formal recognition of its falsity was not revolution-
ary. Moreover, to the extent the rape shield rules do reject preex-
isting assumptions, they do so by following the more general view,
represented in other rules, that character evidence should be ad-
mitted in only the most limited circumstances. Thus, the rape
shield rules harmonize well established evidence doctrine.
In one sense, however, the rape shield rules do represent some-
thing of a structural change. For the most part, modern evidence
rules, including the Federal Rules, are written so as to apply
equally to all types of cases. To the extent that the rape shield rules
single out a particular type of evidence for exclusion in a certain
class of cases, they arguably violate this general principle. 3 9 But
they do so in a rather mild sense, and, as already explained, they do
so in a way quite consistent with the general thrust of the law's
treatment of character. To the degree that the rules depart from
the structure of evidence law, therefore, the departure is not partic-
ularly significant.
137. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (permitting evidence of a "pertinent trait" of
a crime victim's character).
138. The existence of this power helps to explain the failure of Arizona and Utah to
enact specific rape shield rules. See supra note 131.
139. The degree to which Proposed Rules 413-415 change the landscape by creating
different evidence rules for specified classes of cases is discussed infra notes 159-161
and accompanying text.
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5. Summarizing the effect of the political process on other rules
The preceding discussion does not explore fully the areas in
which political considerations have driven the provisions of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. A complete list would certainly include
discussion of a number of other areas, most notably privileges
(which were considered so politically sensitive that no specific rules
were adopted). Discussion of other examples, however, would not
change the essential point: though political concerns have in-
formed the evidence rule-making process, they have led to incre-
mental rather than revolutionary change in the rules applicable at
common law. Indeed, though one can only speculate, it is alto-
gether possible that even absent codification, most of the changes
represented by the rules discussed above would have occurred as a
part of the common law process.
It would be much more difficult to make the same case for Pro-
posed Rules 413-415. The next section will address those rules.
IV. Proposed Rules 413-415
This section will consider the effects the proposed rules would
have on the admissibility of character evidence and on the general
structure of the Federal Rules. As will be shown, the proposed
rules would open wide the door to character evidence currently
kept virtually closed. In addition, by accelerating a process of carv-
ing out particular kinds of cases for different evidentiary treatment,
the proposed rules would significantly alter the present relatively
uniform treatment of both civil and criminal cases from an eviden-
tiary standpoint. These changes are far more fundamental than the
changes created by the political process in the other evidence rules
considered above. Before the effects of the proposed rules can be
considered, however, it is necessary to set forth exactly what they
would permit that is now forbidden.
A. The Proposed Rules: What They Would Do
While many things about Proposed Rules 413-415 are unclear, 4 °
the rules clearly carve out particular types of criminal and civil
cases and render admissible what normally would be excluded:
140. There are numerous ambiguities in the proposed rules. This makes it difficult
to determine their precise scope. Some of the key ambiguities were addressed in a
letter from a group of law professors, including the author, in response to the invita-
tion for comments issued by Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Chair of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Evidence Rules. The following excerpts are taken from the law professors'
letter:
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The first sentence of FRE 413 and 414 states that evidence of prior sexual
offenses or child molestation "is admissible, and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." Is a distinction being drawn
between the decision on admissibility and consideration by the jury? Is a
judge required to admit irrelevant evidence, but then instruct the jury to
consider it only on points to which the jury finds it to be relevant? How
much discretion, if any, does the judge have to decide what prior sexual of-
fenses are relevant? We believe the Rules should be amended to make clear
that the relevancy determination is for the trial judge under Rule 104(a)
rather than under Rule 104(b).
Does the "is admissible" language mean that the new Rules override other
evidentiary restrictions on the form of evidence, such as the expert opinion
rules, hearsay, authentication, and best evidence requirements? Do the
Rules mean to admit hearsay evidence of prior sexual offense? For example,
would the prosecution be permitted to call a police officer to testify about
what other victims told the officer? Would reputation for being a sex of-
fender be admissible under these rules as circumstantial evidence that de-
fendant did in fact commit other acts? Do the proposed rules mean to make
admissible expert testimony concerning pedophile profiles? Battering par-
ent profiles? Could a witness testify that she looked at defendant's rap sheet
and that it reflected several prior acts of sexual misconduct? Do the new
rules abrogate the best evidence rule?
Subparagraph (d) of FRE 413 and 414 defines "offense of sexual assault"
to mean a criminal offense "that involved" certain specified sexual conduct.
But what if the past offense was not a sexual offense but nonetheless "in-
volved" sexual misconduct, such as a kidnapping conviction where sexual
contact occurred. Are such convictions within the definition?
Subparagraph (d) also covers crimes involving specified sexual contact
"without consent." Does this mean "actual" or "lawful" consent? If it
means "lawful" consent, then offenses such as statutory rape, incest, and per-
haps even acts of prostitution would be included within the definition of
"offense of sexual assault." Is this the intent of the drafters?
An "offense of sexual assault" is defined to mean an offense involving
certain listed conduct that is a crime under federal law or the law of "a"
state, thus incorporating by reference the varying state definitions of sexual
offenses, some of which are much broader than the federal definitions. Did
Congress intend to allow the law of one state to set the standard for admis-
siblity in criminal trials by making evidence of the act admissible in a federal
trial even if the defendant's conduct did not occur in that state?
Because under the new rules the evidence "may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant," this presumably would make
it admissible on the issue of credibility. While we doubt that this is what
Congress intended, the issue needs to be clarified. In particular, was the rule
intended to admit evidence that would be excluded by the narrowly drafted
language of Rule 608(b)? What if defendant was charged with the conduct,
but acquitted? The evidence would not be admissible under Rule 609, but
would it now be admissible under the new rules? If the conduct has been the
subject of a criminal conviction, would it be broadly admissible without con-
sideration of the very delicate balance that the rule strikes for every other
type of case? Should we make any accommodation, as does Rule 609, for
very old conduct, conduct by a juvenile, or conduct that was pardoned?
Would acts such as these be admissible based on other impeachment theo-
nes, such as to show that the defendant's story is improbable, or to establish
bias?
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character evidence in the form of specific prior acts to prove "any
matter to which [such acts are] relevant," including, of course, that
the person possessed a trait of character that made it more likely
he committed the offense in question. This is precisely the infer-
ence otherwise forbidden by a long tradition of evidence law.
Rules 413 and 414 are identical in structure. They differ only in
their application to different types of criminal prosecutions. Rule
413 is applicable to prosecutions for "sexual assault," which the
rule defines to include violations of any federal or state 141 law fall-
ing into several broad categories. 42 The key provision of the rule
states:
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an of-
fense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission
of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible,
and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it
is relevant.14 3
Proposed Rule 414 concerns prosecutions for "child molestation,"
which is also broadly defined in terms of both federal and state
Are there any inconsistencies between the policies and procedures of the
new rules and FRE 412? Will courts view it as constitutional to permit the
government to offer evidence of certain prior sexual conduct of the defend-
ant, but not to allow the defendant to offer similar evidence relating to the
alleged victim? If courts vitiate the rape shield statute on this ground, the
new Rules could have the effect of making the prosecution of sex crimes
more difficult, not easier.
Letter from group of law professors to Hon. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Chair, Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules 3-5 (Oct. 12, 1994). The letter also cited a number of
concerns about the merits of the proposed rules. Id. at 1-3.
141. For purposes of the proposed rules, "state" is defined in accordance with the
definition in 18 U.S.C. § 513(c)(5) (1988), which defines "state" to include the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and "any other territory or pos-
session of the Unites States," in addition to the fifty states.
142. Proposed FED. R. EvID. 413(d) refers to:
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code;
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or
an object and the genitals or anus of another person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant
and any part of another person's body;
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death,
bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in paragraphs
(1)-(4).
18 U.S.C. ch. 109A, referred to in subdivision (1), sets forth the crimes of "aggravated
sexual abuse", "sexual abuse", "sexual abuse of a minor or ward", and "abusive sex-
ual contact". 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2244 (1988).
143. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
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law.144 Its key provision is identical to that in Proposed Rule 413,
simply substituting the term "child molestation" for "sexual
assault.' 1 45
Proposed Rule 415 is similar to the first two, but applies to "civil
cases concerning sexual assault or child molestation." Its key pro-
vision states:
In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is
predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constitut-
ing an offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of
that party's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered
as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules. 46
From the language "may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant" specifically contained in Proposed
Rules 413 and 414, and incorporated by reference in Proposed
Rule 415, it seems clear that Congress intended to permit the
factfinder to draw an otherwise impermissible character infer-
ence. 147 To take a simple example, suppose defendant is charged
with a crime of "sexual assault" as defined in Proposed Rule 413.
If defendant has previously committed an offense of sexual as-
144. Proposed FED. R. EvID. 414(d) provides that a "child" is a person under the
age of fourteen. The rule defines "offense of child molestation" as:
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code,
that was committed in relation to a child;
(2) any conduct proscribed by chapter 110 of title 18, United States Code;
(3) contact between any part of the defendant's body or an object and the
genitals or anus of a child;
(4) contact between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any part of
the body of a child;
(5) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death,
bodily injury, or physical pain on a child; or
(6) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in paragraphs
(1)-(5).
Id. 18 U.S.C. ch. 110, referred to in sub. (2), concerns "sexual exploitation of chil-
dren". 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2257 (1988).
145. Proposed FED. R. EvID. 414(a).
146. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
147. Subdivision (c) of each rule is somewhat ambiguous. It provides: "This rule
shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence under any
other rule." Presumably, this provision is intended to ensure that the new rules would
not exclude evidence otherwise admissible under other rules. It does not appear to
make the new rules subject to the exclusionary provisions of existing rules such as
Rule 404(a). If that were the intent, subdivision (c) would eviscerate the primary
thrust of the new rules, contained in subdivision (a).
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sault,148 the court would allow the jury to engage in the following
reasoning:
-- EVIDENCE: Defendant committed a sexual assault in the
past.
-- INFERENCE: Defendant is the kind of person who would
commit offenses of sexual assault.' 49
---> CONCLUSION: Defendant committed the sexual as-
sault for which he is currently on trial. 50
In the absence of Rule 413, of course, this inference would be for-
bidden by Rule 404(a). 15' Under the terms of Proposed Rule 414,
the same inferences would be permitted in child molestation prose-
cutions and in civil cases for sexual assault or child molestation
under Proposed Rule 415.
There is even some question whether the trial court has discre-
tion to exclude the evidence in the event the court believes the
evidence raises dangers that far exceed its probative value. The
language of all three proposed rules provides that the evidence "is
148. The rule does not prescribe how a court is to deal with a situation in which
there is a dispute as to whether defendant in fact committed the prior offense. In the
absence of any indication of Congressional intent to the contrary, however, it is likely
that the court will determine, consistent with its holding in Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), that the decision is to be made subject to the standard of
FED. R. EvID. 104(b). That is, the court is to admit the evidence of the prior offense if
the prosecution offers evidence sufficient to support a finding that the offense in fact
occurred.
149. The generalization or premise supporting this inference is that people who
engage in certain kinds of behavior do so, at least in part, because they possess a trait
of character that predisposes them to such behavior.
150. The generalization or premise supporting this conclusion is that people who
possess a trait of character that predisposes them to certain behavior and who have in
fact engaged in that behavior are somewhat more likely to engage in that behavior
repeatedly than are people who do not possess the relevant character trait.
151. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. This does not mean, of course,
that under existing law the evidence necessarily would be excluded altogether. In
some instances, for example, a series of similar assaults might tend to establish a pat-
tern of conduct that cuts against the defendant's consent defense in the present case.
If so, the court could admit the evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), though it would
also be obligated by Rule 105 to issue a limiting instruction sua sponte or if defendant
requests one. Caution should be exercised in such a case, however. The inference to
intent is arguably weak, and the danger that the jury will misuse the evidence by
invoking a character inference is great. A few jurisdictions have, in the past, admitted
evidence of a rape defendant's prior similar offenses on the ground that such offenses
demonstrated a "depraved sexual instinct" that made criminal intent likely in the in-
stant case. But such a theory is suspect, and Indiana, one of the few states that had
recognized such a doctrine, recently abrogated it. See Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d
1334 (Ind. 1992). Still, however, a number of states retain the "depraved sexual in-
stinct" rule in child sexual abuse cases. See Bryden & Park, supra note 117, at 558-59.
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admissible,' 52 rather than "may be admitted" or other permissive
language sometimes found in the Federal Rules 153 Whether the
drafters intended this language to remove the trial court's discre-
tion under such rules as Rule 403 is not clear.154
B. The Proposed Rules' Effect on the Traditional Treatment of
Character Evidence
An earlier section of this Essay briefly sketched the common law
and Federal Rule treatment of character evidence to prove extraju-
dicial conduct.1 55 The severe restrictions on the use of such evi-
dence are justified primarily by the view that the evidence, while
arguably relevant, generally carries low probative value but high
potential for unfair prejudice. In addition, the Rules flow from the
position that it is morally wrong to try a person based on her (pos-
sible) character or for her past misdeeds. The effect of these views
on the shape of the evidence law should not be underestimated.
The sharp restrictions on the use of character to prove both extra-
judicial and in-court conduct 56 most likely have a significant effect
on the trial. Given the temptation for wide use of character evi-
dence that would no doubt exist in the absence of these rules, it is
fair to say that the rules are among the most regulative of strategic
litigative behavior.
Proposed Rules 413 to 415 would shake this structure in funda-
mental ways. The proposed rules would ignore traditional skepti-
cism about the probative value of character evidence as proof of
conduct. This they would do in particular classes of cases and in
the absence of specific empirical support for the assumption that
152. Proposed FED. R. EvID. 413-415, subdivision (a).
153. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("[Elvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
... may ... be admissible" for certain purposes); FED. R. EvID. 407 (subsequent
remedial measures rule "does not require the exclusion of evidence. . ." for certain
purposes); FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (a witness's credibility "may be attacked or sup-
ported" by opinion or reputation evidence under certain circumstances); FED. R.
EvID. 608(b) (specific instances of conduct probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness
"may... in the discretion of the court, .. . be inquired into on cross-examination of
the witness. 
.. ").
154. In its proposed redraft of the rules, the Advisory Committee has included lan-
guage making clear that evidence offered pursuant to the new rules is subject to the
Rule 403 balancing standard. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, proposed amendment to Rule 404(a) (October, 1994).
155. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
156. The Federal Rules governing the use of character to prove extrajudicial con-
duct are summarized supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. The use of character
evidence as bearing on the credibility of a witness is discussed supra notes 14-17 and
accompanying text.
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such evidence has greater probative value in those cases than in
others.
It is particularly interesting that the empirical evidence, while
hardly conclusive, appears to suggest precisely the opposite of what
the rules assume. While it is difficult to determine empirically
whether a person who has committed an act of sexual assault or
child molestation is more likely to repeat the conduct than a person
who has committed another crime, one can examine such things as
recidivism rates for persons convicted of various crimes. Though
the statistics are inconclusive and might be somewhat counterintui-
tive, they suggest, in fact, that the recidivism rate for sex offenders
is lower than that for many other types of offenders. 157 One com-
mentator has discussed the assumption that sex offenders are par-
ticularly likely to repeat their crimes, and summarized what
appears to be the true state of affairs:
It is true that this belief is common among laypersons. There is
even some support for the belief in the older medical literature.
However, the most recent research largely discredits the old
medical literature sanctioning the lay belief. On several Federal
Bureau of Investigation ratings of recidivism, sex offenses rank
quite low. It is also clear that the recidivism varies radically
among types of sex offenses; it is silly to generalize about the
recidivism of sex offenders as a broad category. 58
Congress seems to have ignored this evidence when proposing the
adoption of Rules 413 to 415.
157. See Bryden & Park, supra note 117. The authors discuss a 1989 Bureau of
Justice Statistics report that tracked 100,000 prisoners for three years after release.
The report found the following rates for rearrest for the same type of crime:
burglary ......................................................... 31.9%
drug offenders ........ ....... .............................. 24.8%
violent robbers .................................................. 19.6%
rapists .......................................................... 7.7%
Only the rate for those convicted of homicide, at 2.8 %, was lower than that for rape.
Id. at 572 (discussing ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPr. OF
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989)).
It has been suggested that the recidivism rate for sex offenders is greatly under-
stated because such offenders may commit many unreported crimes. See Bryden &
Park, supra note 117, at 573. One researcher, for example, reported that in response
to an anonymous questionnaire, convicted rapists and child molesters reported that
they had committed two to five times as many sex crimes than those for which they
had been apprehended). A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism Among
Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 450, 453-54 (1982).
158. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 4.16, at
45 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
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If the proposed rules become effective, it should be anticipated
that the prosecution in criminal sexual assault and child molesta-
tion cases, and civil plaintiffs in such matters, will frequently offer
such evidence. If admitted, the evidence will likely have a signifi-
cant impact on the factfinder, and will no doubt affect the outcome
of a large number of these types of cases. These effects will be
magnified if it is determined that Congress intended to make such
evidence admissible categorically, denying the trial court its gen-
eral power to exclude evidence when its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the dangers it creates.159 It is difficult to
imagine, however, that Congress intended to turn the trial judge
into a kind of administrative clerk rather than a person whose job
is to exercise careful judgment in the context of each situation.
Of course, few federal criminal or civil trials concern matters of
sexual assault or child molestation. But the Federal Rules have
been extremely influential in the states.160 Because the lion's share
of sexual assault and child molestation cases are brought in state
court, it can be expected that, if adopted, the proposed rules will
also have a substantial impact on the states.' 6 '
159. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
160. As of this writing, thirty-eight states (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) have adopted evidence codifications based
in substantial part on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
161. It is not unlikely, however, that judges will resist applying rules that so funda-
mentally alter the principles and standards with which the judges are familiar. Cali-
fornia's experience with the so-called "Victims' Bill of Rights" provides a particularly
good example. In 1982, the voters approved an amendment to the California consti-
tution that provided for much broader admissibility of damaging evidence against a
criminal defendant. One provision, for example, states:
Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding,
whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for
purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal pro-
ceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense,
it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28. The California Supreme Court read this categorical lan-
guage was read in a decidedly uncategorical way in People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111(Cal. 1985). In Castro, the court held that the voters did not intend to abolish the trial
court's discretion to exclude prior convictions when their probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
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C. The Proposed Rules' Effect on the Unitary Nature of
Evidence Law
In creating specific rules of evidence applicable to certain classes
of cases but not others, Congress may have signalled a change in
the basic structure of evidence law. Though there are some excep-
tions under existing law, 62 at present the formal law of evidence
does not apply differently in different kinds of cases, whether civil
or criminal. In addition, again with limited exceptions, 163 the law
does not generally treat differently the two sides in a particular dis-
pute. Instead, a unitary set of rules applies to all cases and to all
litigants.
By defining certain classes of cases and permitting one party to
offer an especially volatile type of evidence for a purpose that
would otherwise be forbidden, Congress arguably has worked a
fundamental change in the structure of the evidence law. This
change, especially if it marks the beginning of a trend, would have
several effects, two of which seem especially important. First, it
would make the law of evidence considerably more complex than it
already is. It is already difficult enough for courts and counsel to
learn the intricacies of the evidence rules; considerably more diffi-
culty, dispute and appellate litigation can be expected if the rules
are further complicated by the proposed changes.
Second, the treatment of litigants in different kinds of cases with
different evidentiary standards arguably changes the nature and
purpose of evidence rules and codes. Evidence law is hardly neu-
tral today from a substantive standpoint,'" but neither is it perva-
sively substantive in effect. For the most part, the rules of evidence
are designed to facilitate the truth-seeking function rather than
serve substantive policy. In the absence of specific support for the
value of character evidence in sexual assault and child molestation
cases, it is difficult to see how admitting such evidence will enhance
truth-determination. It seems equally plausible that truth-determi-
nation will suffer.
162. The most obvious example is the rape shield legislation, discussed supra notes
114-140 and accompanying text.
163. An exception is Rule 404(a)(1), which permits the criminal defendant to offer
character evidence as circumstantial proof of her innocence of the crime. If the de-
fendant chooses not to do this, the prosecution is forbidden from offering such
evidence.
164. See Leonard, supra note 34.
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V. Conclusion
From the outset, the Federal Rules of Evidence have been a curi-
ous blend of conservatism about the evidence law and political
compromise. The first feature, conservatism, should not be surpris-
ing, given the rather human tendency of judges and lawyers to re-
tain the familiar and to resist change. The second feature, political
compromise, is inevitable, given the involvement of all three
branches of the federal government in the rule-making process.
Thus, tension between retaining what appears to work (even if it
means adhering to rules of questionable validity) and satisfying
political constituencies has always existed. Until now, this tension
has kept largely in check the temptation to overemphasize either
desire by tipping the rules too much toward either extreme. With
the proposal of Rules 413 to 415, however, Congress has asserted
its political will too strongly out of a desire to be "tough on crime."
The cost has been subordination of the interest in conserving long-
standing concepts and allowing change to occur incrementally.
It may well be wise to review the law's current treatment of char-
acter evidence as circumstantial proof of extrajudicial behavior.165
If there is sufficient empirical support for the proposition that cer-
tain forms of such evidence are highly probative (particularly spe-
cific instances of conduct very similar to the conduct at issue) are
especially probative, the law should indeed make such evidence
more widely available to the factfinder. But in its zeal to respond
to what is perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be an epidemic of sex-
ual assault and child molestation, Congress may have sparked a
movement among state courts and legislatures that will be difficult
to stop. Whether this eventually will occur will be determined over
time, but the danger is very real that an effort to serve a sincerely
held position of substantive policy could undermine the delicate
balance represented by the rules of evidence.
165. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 158, § 4.16, at 45.
